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Resume: Russell’s initial project in philosophy (1898) was to make mathematics rigorous reducing 
it to logic. Before August 1900, however, Russell’s logic was nothing but mereology. First, his 
acquaintance with Peano’s ideas in August 1900 led him to discard the part-whole logic and accept 
a kind of intensional predicate logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Rus-
sell embrace a technique of treating the paradox of infinite numbers with the help of a singular 
concept, which he called “denoting phrase”. Unfortunately, a new paradox emerged soon: that 
of classes. The main contention of this paper is that Russell’s new conception only transferred the 
paradox of infinity from the realm of infinite numbers to that of class-inclusion. Russell’s long-
elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was nothing but to set aside 
of some of the ideas he adopted with his turn of August 1900: (i) With the Theory of Descriptions, 
he reintroduced the complexes we are acquainted with in logic. In this way, he partly restored 
the pre-August 1900 mereology of complexes and simples. (ii) The elimination of classes, with 
the help of the “substitutional theory”,2 and of propositions, by means of the Multiple Relation 
Theory of Judgment, completed this process.
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ПовороТ 1900 года в логиКе БерТрана раССела, 
воЗниКновение ПарадоКСа и СПоСоБ его 
раЗрешениЯ
Резюме: исходный философский проект Рассела (1898) состоял в том, чтобы сделать мате-
матику строгой, сведя её к логике. до августа 1900 г., однако, логика Рассела представляла 
собой не более чем мереологию. в августе 1900 г. он познакомился с идеями Пеано, что 
привело его к отказу от логики части и целого и принятию вместо неё своего рода интен-
сиональной логики предикатов. Среди прочего, логика предикатов помогла Расселу найти 
способ справиться с парадоксом бесконечных чисел с помощью одного-единственного по-
нятия — того, что он назвал «обозначающим выражением». к сожалению, вскоре обнару-
жился новый парадокс, на этот раз связанный с классами. основной тезис данной статьи 
состоит в том, что новая концепция Рассела лишь перенесла парадокс бесконечности 
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из области бесконечных чисел в сферу отношений включения на множествах. Решение па-
радокса, над которым Рассел долго работал в период между 1905 и 1908 гг., заключалось не 
в чём ином, как в том, чтобы отказаться от некоторых идей, принятых им во время «пово-
рота» в августе 1900 г. (i) в теории дескрипций была отчасти восстановлена мереология 
сложных и простых объектов в духе периода, предшествовавшего августу 1900 г. (ii) Эли-
минация классов посредством «подстановочной теории» и устранение пропозиций за счёт 
теории суждения как множественного отношения завершили этот процесс.
Ключевые слова: логика Рассела, мереология, парадокс, теория дескрипции, подстановочная 
теория. 1. russell as a Mereologist
In 1898, Russell abandoned his short period of adherence to the Neo-Hegelian position 
in the philosophy of mathematics and replaced it with what can be called the “analytic 
philosophy of mathematics”, substantiated by the logic of relations. To be more exact, 
Russell took his first step in this direction after reading A. N. Whitehead’s A Treatise on 
Universal Algebra in March 1898. In contrast to his philosophy of mathematics, Russell’s 
logic became predominantly analytical only after he read Cantor’s Grundlagen einer 
allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre at the beginning of July 1899. This change is docu-
mented in the manuscript of “Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics” (1899), 
in which Russell adopted a full-blooded mereology for the first time. Now, he claimed 
that the relation of “logical priority”, understood as the relation between the whole and 
the part, is central in logic.
In Russell’s part-whole logic, the logical consequence holds between both terms and 
propositions. Russell maintained that “it is possible for simple concepts [i.e., not only 
propositions] to imply others” [Russell 1899: 293]. In other words, at that point in time, 
what was later called the relationship of “ontological dependence” played the central place 
in Russell’s logic. He further argued that:
“A implies B’ cannot mean ‘A’s truth implies B’s truth’; for here a simpler case 
of implication is explained by one which is more complex. ‘A implies B’ implies ‘A’s truth 
implies B’s truth’ and also implies ‘B’s falsehood implies A’s falsehood’. But ‘A implies 
B’ applies to A and B simply as propositions, and quite independently of their truth 
or falsehood.” [Russell 1899: 292]
Russell’s mereological logic had three sources:
(i) His basic categories of whole and part were connected “with Boole’s logical system” 
[Moore 1993a: xxiii]. Indeed, in dropping “any use of magnitude and studying objects 
defined by their laws of combination alone”, Russell followed the spirit of Boole (see 
[Bornet 1995: 238]).
(ii) The 1899–1900 logic of Russell was inspired by G. E. Moore’s Relational Theory 
of Judgment, as stated in Moore’s paper “The Nature of Judgment” (1899). It maintained 
that “all concepts of a proposition are to be regarded at the same logical and ontological 
level, together with the ‘external’ relations joining them, which must be seen as terms 
as real as the rest” [Rodríguez-Consuegra 1991: 32]. In fact, this single-level logic was 
the archetype of Russell’s logical explorations at the time.3
3 It so happened, however, that Russell was urged two times to substantially revise it (cf. § 6).
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(iii) Another much older impulse to adopt mereology came directly from absolute 
idealism. Indeed, absolute idealism, both German and British, was essentially mereo-
logical. 2. the turn
In the first year of the new millennium (1900), Russell gradually adopted two novel-
ties in his logic, developed in full first in the Principles of Mathematics (1903): the “ma-
terial implication” and the predicate logic in the form of the theory of denoting. Both, 
in particular, changed Russell’s methods of constructing units.2.1. Material implication
Besides the relationship between the part and the whole, under the continuing influ-
ence of Moore’s work in philosophical logic (especially of his paper “Necessity” (1900)) 
in the first few months of 1900, Russell embraced the view that there is another relation-
ship, that of implication, which holds only between propositions, not between terms. 
Russell soon found out that this relation is logically more fundamental. 
In fact, the idea of what was termed “material implication” a year later, was already 
articulated in the manuscript “The Principles of Mathematics, Draft of 1899–1900”. 
The material implication here is set out in Moorean terms: “Whenever A implies B, we have 
also the following propositions: A’s truth implies B’s truth, and B’s falsehood implies A’s 
falsehood” [Russell 1900: 36]. However, Russell still believed that a proposition can 
imply a term.
The radical and consequent turn against the part-whole logic was taken only after 
Russell became acquainted with the works of Peano. In October 1900, two months after 
the First International Congress of Philosophy held in Paris where Russell met Peano, 
he noted: “I have been wrong in regarding Logical Calculus as having specially to do 
with whole and part. Whole is distinct from Class, and occurs nowhere in the Logical 
Calculus” [Russell 1993b: plate II]. A few weeks later, he wrote in an article on Peano:
“It has been one of the bad effects of the analogy with ordinary Algebra that most 
formal logicians (with the exception of Frege and MacColl) have shown more interest in 
logical equations than in implication” [Russell 1901a: 353].
Russell’s argument for adopting material implication as a basic relationship in logic 
was that the part-whole relation, or the “logical priority of A to B [,] requires not only 
‘B implies A’, but also ‘A does not imply B’” [Russell 1903: § 134]. In contrast, material 
implication is transitive. Consequently, this relation is rather simple than part-whole, and 
thus, more fundamental and more appropriate as a logical constant.
Be as it may, some remnants of the old mereology remained in Russell’s logic. Thus, 
he continued to speak about logical summing of terms, and not only of propositions. 
By Peter Geach’s account, “[t]o a contemporary logician the idea of a disjunction 
of proper names may well seem alien” [Geach 1962: 66]. This case shows that in the 
second half of 1900, Russell did not embrace his new logical conception without reser-
vation.
The acceptance of the material implication as the simplest relation in logic, with the 
help of which all pure mathematics can be deduced (see [Russell 1903: § 1]), made Rus-
125Логико-философские штудии. Вып. 14
N. Milkov. The 1900 turn in Bertrand Russell’s logic, the emergence of his paradox…
sell’s logic intensional. Apparently, this turn towards intensional logic was also con-
nected with his treatment of infinity, which we will discuss in the next subsection.2.2. theory of Denoting and Predicate logic
In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell also formulated his Theory of Denoting 
(see [Russell 1903: Ch. V]) which, in fact, can be seen as nothing but his interpretation 
of Frege’s technique of quantification. The central point of the Theory of Denoting is that 
there are two kinds of denoting: intuitive (immediate) or proper, and symbolic or improp-
er.4 Things have proper meaning, and concepts, improper. This is the case because while 
things occur in a proposition as terms, concepts give rise to “classes as one” (or class-
concepts), which are combinations of terms. They differ from “classes as many”, which 
are merely aggregates of terms. In other words, in a class-concept, “one predicate occurs 
otherwise than as a term” (§ 57). More particularly, it gives rise to denoting. “A concept 
denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about the concept, but 
about the term connected in a certain peculiar way with the concept” (§ 56).5 It does not 
refer to the term directly, but in its interrelationship with other terms. In other words, 
Russell’s Theory of Denoting employs what Michael Dummett later called “Frege’s 
context principle”. Typical examples of denoting concepts are phrases that are quantified, 
and in particular, phrases that contain propositional functions.
To use Frege’s words, denoting phrases put stress on the “organic connection” of the 
propositional function (or concept) with the arguments (or objects) that fall under it. 
Functions are not just aggregates (heaps) of arguments (or objects, or individuals). This 
explains why a propositional function is valid for any argument that falls under it, and 
a concept defines every object (individual) that falls under it. In contrast, both mereo logists 
and Boolean logicians completely disregard the distinction between function, or concept, 
and argument, or individual.
Moreover, predicate logic is the logic of many-orders (types). Its ontology embraces: 
(i) the order of individuals, (ii) that of functions (class-concepts), (iii) that of classes 
of classes, etc. It is true that the first-order predicate logic did not do obvious harm. 
The trouble became visible only when Frege introduced (in “Function and Object”, 1891) 
the notion of “extension of concepts” that are objects themselves. Incidentally, in this 
way, Frege disparaged his own principle that logic has radically different orders — 
a mistake Russell tried to eliminate with his Theory of Types (more about this in § 7).2.3. theory of Denoting and the treatment of infinity
Russell was especially enthusiastic about his Theory of Denoting since it introduced 
a new technique for (intensively) treating infinite collections, including infinite numbers, 
with the help of a singular concept. Here is this story in short.
In his idealistic period, Russell, the Neo-Hegelian, was very sensitive to philosophical 
and logical paradoxes (cf. § 5). To be more exact, up to 1898, he believed that there are 
three paradoxes: of infinitesimals, of continuity, and of infinity. The latter has two forms: 
of actual infinity, and of infinite numbers. 
After his turn of 1898, he changed his mind. This change happened in three steps:
4 Incidentally, Husserl had already accepted this in 1894 (see [Coffa 1991: 101–102]).
5 This conception gave rise to the fruitful ontology of ways, further explored by Wittgenstein.
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(i) In 1898, Weierstrass convinced him to banish the infinitesimals: There is no such 
thing as the “next”. There are no infinitesimal moments, places, etc.6 There are only ele-
ments of finite size that are ordered in different ways.
(ii) Russell eliminated the antinomy of continuity after embracing Cantor’s set theory 
in 1899.
(iii) Based on Cantor’s diagonal method, he also resolved the problem of the actual 
infinity.
Russell, however, did not adopt Cantor’s treatment of infinite ordinal and cardinal 
num bers. More precisely, he did not accept their existence. As a consequence, he still 
believed that:
“Mathematical ideas are almost all infected with one great contradiction. This is the 
contradiction of infinity. All antinomies, I believe, so far as they are valid at all, will be 
found reducible to the antinomy of infinite number” [Russell 1900: 70].
Exactly at this point, Peano’s logic helped Russell. Or rather, he tried to solve his 
“great contradiction” via Peano’s predicate logic. 
A typical example of a denoting concept (phrase) is the infinite collection denoted 
by the concept “all numbers” (the importance of this example will be discussed in § 3).7 
The point in question is that, having no direct connection with the referent, one denoting 
phrase can refer — in the most precise way — to many, including infinitely many, terms. 
In fact, one of Russell’s reasons to introduce the denoting phrases thus understood was 
his endeavour to treat with their help infinite numbers without paradoxes. 
To be more exact, according to Russell’s Theory of Denoting (1903), there are five 
possible forms of denoting, which are nothing but five different ways of referring to terms 
of constructed unities, or totalities. These are characterised by five words “of constant 
occurrence in daily life”: all, every, any, a, some. (i) All means a numerical conjunction 
(“Brown and Jones are two of Miss Smith’s suitors”). (ii) Every means a propositional 
conjunction (“Brown and Jones are paying court to Miss Smith”). (iii) Any is a variable 
conjunction, which is something between conjunction and disjunction (“if it was Brown 
or Jones you met, it was a very ardent lover”). (iv) A gives rise to the variable disjunction 
(“if it was one of Miss Smith’s suitors, it must have been Brown or Jones”). (v) Some 
gives rise to the constant disjunction (“Miss Smith will marry Brown or Jones”).8
Of special interest are the two ways of referring to infinite unities: points “i” and “iv”. 
As already mentioned, at the centre of Russell’s argument was the claim that there are 
two kinds of constructing wholes: aggregates and units. The aggregate “is definite as soon 
as [all] its constituents are known” [Russell 1903: § 135]. In contrast, the unit is inten-
sional. In the aggregate, we have a “numerical conjunction of terms”, while in units, 
6 Russell thought of logic ontologically (he would say “realistically”). He was strongly convinced that 
“logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general 
features” [Russell 1919: 169, = § 5].
7 It deserves notice that already before the Paris Congress, Russell was conscious that the problem 
of totality, where all and any describe various forms of the permutations in a set, is indeed “intimately 
connected” but nevertheless different from that of the whole and part. For example, he maintained that 
“all cannot be defined numerically”, but it nevertheless means a perfectly specified notion [Russell 
1900: 41].
8 This analysis of compositionality is a good example of Russell using ordinary language as a compass 
in philosophy. Ironically enough, in the 1950s, he was strongly against this approach.
127Логико-философские штудии. Вып. 14
N. Milkov. The 1900 turn in Bertrand Russell’s logic, the emergence of his paradox…
we have a “variable disjunction”. The first is a simple summative class and the second 
is a class-concept, or predicate, or propositional function. Russell further claimed that the 
unit is logically more fundamental than the aggregate. Indeed, it is the unit that helps 
resolve the paradox of infinity number. 
Two final remarks:
(i) Besides aggregates and units, in The Principles of Mathematics, Russell also 
held that there is a relation between subordinate aggregates (not between an aggregate 
and a term) that can be called a relation between the whole and the part proper. This 
means that in 1903, Russell did not completely disregard mereology.
(ii) Towards the end of his study of the forms of denoting, Russell found a sixth 
form of denoting, indicated by the definite article “the”. Unfortunately, he had no time 
to make a precise analysis in the Principles. He did it two years later, in his famous 
Theory of Descriptions, in the paper “On Denoting” (1905). This development, however, 
lies beyond the scope of this paper.
To sum up the results we achieved in this section: Russell was fascinated with the 
technique of the quantification of Frege and Peano because it allegedly resolved something 
of greatest importance to him — the paradox of infinite numbers. As a consequence, 
he started to consider unities (totalities) as theoretically more important than aggregates.3. First symptom that the turn Produced Problems:  
the Paradoxes
So far, we have found that in an attempt to escape the paradox of infinity, in The Prin-
ciples of Mathematics, Russell assumed that class-concepts (propositional functions) and 
objects, or individuals (arguments) are radically opposite things. In this, he followed the 
new many-ordered logic of Peano, and ultimately of Frege, which embraced an opposition 
between class-concepts on the one hand, and individuals and terms on the other.
Unfortunately, as a by-product of this conception, another paradox emerged — that 
of classes. All this suggests, and this point shall be examined in a while, that Russell’s 
Peano-Fregean turn9 did not eliminate the paradox of infinity, but merely removed 
it from one realm into another — that is, from the realm of infinite classes to that of class-
inclusion.
This point did not go unnoticed by commentators. According to one of them, Grego-
ry Moore, all the three paradoxes Russell tried to resolve have the same structure. These 
paradoxes are: (i) that of an infinite ordinal number (discovered in July 1899), (ii) that of 
the largest cardinal number (discovered in November 1900), and (iii) Russell’s paradox 
proper (his paradox of classes, discovered in May 1901). Apparently, “this structure was 
presented in the back of his mind as a kind of template that could be unconsciously ap-
plied to Cantor’s work on infinite number” [Moore 1995: 236]. The rest of this section 
shall try to specify this template in more concrete terms.
9 This section shall discuss “Russell’s Peano-Fregean turn” only figuratively. In fact, until June 1902, 
Russell had practically no knowledge of Frege. There are two reasons for using this figure: (i) The gist of Rus-
sell’s turn from August 1900 was the assimilation of the philosophical consequences of Peano’s theory of 
quantification. Today, however, it is widely accepted that Frege’s theory of quantification decisively influenced 
Peano’s theory of quantification (see [Gillies 1982]). This partly explains why, after assimilating Peano’s 
conception, Russell so easily embraced the ideas of Frege. (ii) Russell was also impressed by Peano’s elegant 
symbolism, which was developed “partly under Frege’s influence” [Moore 1998: 732a].
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Russell was convinced that in each contradiction, “there is a common characteristic, 
which we may describe as self-reference or reflexiveness” [Russell 1908: 61]. Again, 
in 1959, he wrote: “in all the logical paradoxes there is a kind of reflexive self-reference 
which is to be condemned on the same ground: viz. that it includes, as a matter of to tality, 
something referring to that totality which can only have a definite meaning if the totality 
is already fixed” [Russell 1908: 63].
Contrary to this conception of the unity of logical paradoxes, after the discovery 
of Russell’s paradox proper, the paradox of classes, philosophers were inclined to mul-
tiply paradoxes ad libitum. Frank Ramsey [Ramsey 1978: 171] made the decisive step 
in this direction, splitting the paradoxes up into semantic and syntactical paradox. 
However, as it was conclusively shown recently, these have one and the same structure 
[Priest 1994].
The self-reference is also characteristic of Russell’s initial paradox of infinite numbers. 
Indeed, he conceived the paradox of infinite numbers in exactly the same form: “There 
are many numbers; therefore, there is a number of numbers. [But] If this be N, N + 1 
is also a number; therefore, there is no number of numbers” [Russell 1899: 265]. In truth, 
this was a proto-variant of Russell’s paradox proper but formulated two years earlier. 
Apparently, the two paradoxes, of infinite numbers and of classes, were only two sides 
of this proto-paradox.
All this explains why, when the problem of infinite numbers was “resolved” after 
August 1900 by way of (Peano’s) treating the number of numbers as a single class-concept, 
immediately after Russell began to work on his newly moulded pure mathematics in detail 
in October 1900, he found, in November 1900, a “mistake in Cantor” exactly on this point 
(the class of all classes). It later turned out to be the “new contradiction”: Whenever 
a greatest cardinal number is accepted, the number of classes is the largest number.
Apparently, in November 1900, Russell merely transformed the paradox of infinite ordi-
nal numbers into a paradox of cardinal numbers (of the largest cardinal number). To be sure, 
“Russell’s antinomy of infinite number … has precisely the same formal structure as the 
paradox of the largest cardinal” [Moore 1995: 226]. Thus, “it was not a new discovery, but 
a shift in how he perceived an argument which he already possessed” [Moore 1995: 231].
Some months later, in May 1901, Russell reformulated his antinomy in terms of 
predicates not predicable of themselves, thus articulating his paradox proper. Only in his 
letters to Frege from June 16, 1902, however, did he formulate it in terms of classes. Now 
his problem was: Is the class of the classes that are not members of themselves a member 
of itself? Russell’s official answer was that, in fact, it is of a type different from that of 
the other objects. To eliminate the possibility of type-confusion, he introduced the “vicious 
circle principle”, according to which “[w]hatever involves all of a collection must not be 
one of the collection” [Russell 1910: 37]. As it shall be shown below, his real answer was 
rather different.4. theoretical source of russell’s Paradox
The gist of this discussion is that in treating ordered collections of any kind, para-
doxes are unavoidable. Apparently, the problems in such cases pertain to the “limits 
to thought whose very notion is dialetheic” [Priest 1991: 369]10 the problem of truth 
10 Kant called them “antinomies of pure reason”.
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(aletheia) is not relevant to them. What can be done in such cases is to treat them not 
in an orderly fashion but analytically, and structurally — for example, via quantifiers. 
In other words, the irreversible order (and with this the infinity) in them can be put 
“in brackets”; we can “seal it off” and to proceed the calculation further.
Incidentally, Russell himself was conscious of the dialetheic limits of human thought. 
This is shown by the fact that the strategy he followed to resolve the problems of continuity 
and infinity was to go beyond conventional intuitions which presuppose an aletheic under-
standing of composing unities (totalities) with individuals (objects). To be more exact, 
following Cantor, he maintained that the problem of infinity can be only overcome if we 
banish a maxim of common sense:11 the intuition that “if one collection is part of another, 
the one which is a part has fewer terms than the one of which it is a part” [Russell 1901b: 373].
Ironically, the trouble with Russell’s paradox was that he, just like Frege, did not ban-
ish the conventional intuitions that led to his paradox: that we can quantify objects of any 
kind, without restriction. To be more exact, Russell failed to structuralise the notion of 
class-membership. Instead, he followed the common-sense belief that the including class 
can comprise everything that falls under it. From the beginning, he rejected the idea that 
there can be subclasses that are not susceptible to class-inclusion (see § 5).
To be more specific, as it has already been mentioned (in § 2.1), in “The Principles 
of Mathematics, Draft of 1899–1900” [Russell 1900], Russell adopted Cantor’s treatment 
of continuity (which developed some of Weierstrass’s points), according to which there 
are no infinitesimals. The moments and places in his logical ontology were absolutely 
determined and finite (cf. n. 6). There are no intervals between them, no next moments or 
places. Between two moments (places), there are always other moments (places). Thus, 
“next” was the first common-sense intuition that Russell, following Cantor, banished.12
This conception sees the world as an assemblage of structures. Indeed, in structures, 
there is no problem of neighbourhood; nor is there a topology of structures. This is because 
it is irrelevant where they are: they are mutually substitutive. With his turn of 1900 — 
to be more exact, with the new, Peano-inspired treating of infinite numbers — Russell 
introduced another structuralist conception based on the one-many relationship. What he 
achieved by adopting the technique of quantification was a new technique of “putting” 
an infinite number into — rather, including it in — one concept or class-concept.
Despite his strong belief to the contrary, however, the problem of infinity was not 
“resolved”. It appeared on the face of the new concept of class-inclusion. Indeed, Russell 
“resolved” the antinomy of infinite numbers but only by transforming it into the antinomy 
of class-inclusion.5. Motives for Asserting the Paradox of classes
Apparently, the reason why Russell stuck to the paradoxes in the philosophy 
of logic and mathematics was his “debt to German learning”.13 Because of it, Russell 
11 Wittgenstein put this matter in similar, yet clearly different terms. The problem of infinity is a product 
of certain (grammatical) misunderstandings, which have to be removed from the calculation [Wittgenstein 
1956: IV, § 6].
12 “The banishment of the infinitesimal has all sorts of odd consequences, to which one has to become 
gradually accustomed. For example, there is no such thing as the next moment” [Russell 1901b: 371].
13 Cf. with the title of Russell’s paper [Russell 1955]. It is important that Russell himself insisted on the na-
tionality of different schools of mathematics and logic (see, for example, [Russell 1901a]). 
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was inclined to become infatuated with insolubilia,14 so that when confronted with 
problems of this kind, he lost his ability to analyse — in this case, to analyse the com-
position of unities (totalities). Historians of analytic philosophy have already noticed 
that while Russell’s official theory was that mathematics is free of paradoxes, deep in 
his mind, he continued to believe that mathematics is paradoxical (see [Garciadiego 
1992: 152]). This explains why he was so sensitive to any sign of paradoxes in logic 
and mathematics.
Especially illuminating in this respect is the fact that it was Frege who made Russell’s 
paradox a paradox. Indeed, as recent historical investigations reveal, “[t]he fact that Frege, 
whose logical work Russell admired intensely, found Russell’s paradox devastating … 
played a major role in convincing him of its fundamental importance” [Moore 1995: 235]. 
Until Frege’s reaction to Russell’s problem in his historic letter of 22 June 1902, Russell’s 
friends Couturat and Peano, as well as Whitehead, who shared most of his logical ideas, 
were not impressed with his trouble at all. This explains why, before communicating the 
“contradiction” to Frege, Russell was uncertain “as to how important his paradox actu-
ally was” [Moore 2013: xxxiii]. But, why was that so?15
First of all, both Frege and Russell were more philosophically oriented than the afore-
mentioned logicians. The trouble with Russell, in particular, was that, as we have already 
mentioned (in n. 6), he stuck to his philosophical realism. The ontology that underlined 
his logic consisted of realistic categories such like “points” and “moments”. Frege’s 
problem was even greater. He was convinced that “axioms should express truths and 
definitions should give the meanings. … If the terms in the proposed axioms do not have 
meaning beforehand, then the statements cannot be true (or false), and thus they cannot be 
axioms” [Shapiro 1996: 161]. And this is even more important since logic is the science 
of truth.
The philosophical realism both Frege and Russell stuck to explains why they used 
“quantifiers as varying over everything in the universe” [Moore 2013: xxiv]. Today, we 
know that the most important lesson from the spectacular failure of Frege’s logicist pro-
gramme was that “we cannot uncritically assume the existence of universal domain of 
quantification” [Simons 2007: 238]16. Peano, for one, did not share this belief. He also 
did not make use of propositional functions (cf. [Russell 1903: § 22]). That also explains 
why he was not impressed with Russell’s “contradiction”.
The main point, which supports our thesis that Russell himself created his paradox, 
or, to be more accurate, that he remoulded an old paradox of his into his paradox of 
classes, is that, as already mentioned, many other logicians did not see a paradox here. 
Among them were also Stanislaw Leśniewski and Kurt Gödel. Their approach is  especially 
telling from our perspective since they directed their attention to analysing Russell’s 
14 Some authors have justly noted that “in a neo-Hegelian vein — he [Russell] collected as many para-
doxes as he could” [Grattan-Guinness 1986: 108].
15 Griffin tried to answer this question without referring to Frege [Griffin 2004]. He was convinced that 
“Russell was not the first person to find a paradox in set theory, but he was the first to make a really big fuss 
about it” (p. 349). As just seen, however, the first to “make a big fuss about it” was Frege, not Russell. This 
point reveals an important difference between Griffin’s (and that of some other mainstream historians of ana-
lytic philosophy) approach and the approach we follow in this paper. The former is fine-grained, going deep 
into formal details. Our approach, in contrast, tries to draw a more general logico-philosophical picture of the 
developments under review in order to suggest the best explanation.
16 Simons refers here to Dummett [Dummett 1973: 455 ff].
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concept of unity or totality. In particular, both criticised Russell’s understanding 
of classes as class-concepts.
Gödel was especially clear on this point: “[O]ne may, on good grounds, deny that 
reference to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it” [Gödel 
1944: 135]. All is not necessarily an infinite logical conjunction. Indeed, we have already 
seen (in § 2.3) that Russell himself enumerated five different ways of constructing unities. 
Oddly enough, though he knew these alternatives, he stuck to one — point “iv” in our 
notation.
Much before Gödel, however, Leśniewski had already suggested an extensive solution 
to Russell’s paradox in 1927, pointing out that it rests on the same one-sided use of the 
concept of class. To eliminate it, Leśniewski discriminated between a collective and 
distributive conception of class. Something is a member of a distributive class if and only 
if it is ipso facto this class.17 In contrast, a member of a collective class need not be ipso 
facto that class (see [Leśniewski 1927–31: 17]). Russell’s paradox would not have emerged 
had he assumed that all classes were distributive; in this case, there is no such object 
as the class of classes that are not members of themselves.
Of course, this was not the single possible way to face Russell’s paradox. For example, 
David Hilbert and his acolytes in Göttingen followed an alternative direction. They (Ernst 
Zermelo, in particular) tried to “reform logic” through axiomatizing set theory (see [Peck-
haus 2004: 510]). 6. russell’s Main trouble inflicted  
by the turn of 1900
George Santayana had once said that Russell “was a failure”. Russell’s task was to 
renew Frances Bacon’s project for a great instauratio magna of all sciences. Instead, 
he was involved in exploring subjectivist epistemological problems. Hao Wang surmised 
that this failure was due to the harmful influence of Wittgenstein. This section will show 
that what occasioned Russell’s “failure” was, above all, Frege’s influence on his logic, 
and not the influence of Wittgenstein alone. The latter simply transported Frege’s in- 
fluence to Russell.
Russell himself felt dissatisfied with The Principles of Mathematics upon finishing it. 
On 2 August 1902, he wrote in a letter to Miss G. L. Dickinson: “…the proofs come oc-
casionally, and seem to me very worthless; I have a poor opinion of the stuff when I think 
of what it ought to be” [Moore 1993b: xxxviii]. Two and a half months before that, on 
16 May, Russell wrote to his wife, Alys: “This is not the true artistic conscience, but that is 
a luxury I can no longer afford for the present” [Moore 2013: xxx]. And three days later, 
he wrote: “…the final product is not a work of art, as I had hoped it would be” [Russell 
1992: 234].
So, what caused this disappointment?
Apparently, to Russell, the “beauty” of his initial project (1898 — August 1900) 
came with the ease with which it treated different problems by way of one and the same 
concept — the concept of order, elaborated with the help of the logic of relations.18 
17 Leśniewski borrowed the very terminology of collective and distributive classes from Tadeusz Kotarbiński 
much later.
18 Hager partly supports this view [Hager 1994].
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The chapters of this project were: logical order (based on implication), the order of whole 
and part (based on the extensive class-inclusion), the order of numbers, and spatial 
and temporal order.19 Organized this way, the work really did promise to be “as clear 
as a crystal”.20
This project was rooted in the one-order logic developed by Moore in 1899, which 
decisively influenced Russell’s project to reform logic (cf. § 1 [ii], above). It was also 
closely connected with the method of reductive analysis, which can be especially well 
embedded in a kind of part-whole logic.
In contrast, Frege’s philosophical logic assumed a deep, many-ordered, intentional 
logic that is fruitful, and in which the function is organically connected to all individuals 
who fall under it and so determines them. It persuaded Russell to assume that logical 
terms are heteromorphic, divided into strata: terms, propositions, functions, proposi-
tional functions, and classes (terms and denoting phrases). This was the first lesson 
in logic Russell learned from Frege (cf. § 2.3).
This lesson had grave consequences for both Russell’s logic and philosophy. As it 
can be seen in the next section (§ 7), between 1903 and 1910, Russell tried to mitigate 
the damages it induced in his programme of analysis. It also deserves notice at this point 
that, as it has been shown elsewhere, a “second lesson” in the logic of Frege that Rus-
sell learned through Wittgenstein in 1913 urged him to further revise his philosophy 
and logic. 
In Russell’s defence, it can be mentioned that he took this turn with hesitation, making 
many efforts to evade those elements in it that were alien to his authentic, extensional 
logical intuitions. As a result, his “logic remained of a quite different character from 
[Frege’s]” [Grattan-Guinness 1988: 77b]21. 
From the point of view of the mathematical logic, Russell’s doubts can be explained 
by the fact that with his turn of August 1900, Russell tried to synthesize two traditions in 
it: First, the algebraic line launched by De Morgan and developed further by Boole, Peirce, 
Schröder, and Whitehead. Second, the programme to improve the rigour of mathematical 
analysis laid down by Cauchy and developed further by some continental mathematicians 
and logicians like Weierstrass, Peano and Frege. “[T]he algebraists (like Grassman) used 
part-whole theory, whereas mathematical logicians used Cantorian set theory” [Grattan-
Guinness 1996: 212].
From the point of view of philosophical logic, there were at least two symptoms 
to show how adopting the elements of Frege’s logic alienated Russell from his authen-
tic direction: (i) “[T]he recognition of denoting concepts was inconsistent with [Russell’s 
metaphysical] mo nism” [Coffa 1991: 106] that was proclaimed with the acceptance 
of realism in 1898. Indeed, it introduced different layers of being. (ii) The adoption of 
propositional function in 1903 forced to some extent the readmission of the subject-
predicate pattern (by means of propositional functions) and, therefore, the abandonment 
of the relational ontology that was implicit in Moore’s theory of judgment [Rodríguez-
Consuegra 1993: 80]. 
19 In accepting the concept of order as central to his logic, Russell followed — directly or indirectly — 
Hermann Lotze (cf. [Beaney 2008]).
20 This was Wittgenstein’s judgment on his Tractatus.
21 A point often discussed in the newer literature [Mayer 1996: 135; Peregrin 2001; Beaney 2008].
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In contrast to Russell, Edmund Husserl, who was very well informed about the new 
developments in logic and mathematics, was convinced that the most important achieve-
ment in the logic of the fin the siècle period was the new mereology (not Frege’s technique 
of quantification, with which Husserl was well acquainted), or the logic of terms. Philo-
sophers had to follow it as well.7. russell’s Way out — theory of Descriptions  
and other Emendations
After years of heroic efforts, Russell found some tentative solutions to his paradox. 
First, his Ramified Theory of Types set aside some philosophical assumptions in logic he 
and Frege had made which clearly contradicted their many-ordered logic: that there is 
a universal (one-levelled) domain of quantification. It deserves notice, however, that Rus-
sell, even in (1919), was not so confident about how sound this solution was. He clearly 
felt that “the theory of types emphatically does not belong to the finished and certain part 
of our subject: much of this theory is still inchoate, confused, and obscure” [Russell 
1919: 135]. Russell simply believed in “the need of some doctrine of types” [Russell 
1919: 135].
Much more successful in solving his paradox was the Theory of Descriptions (1905). 
In fact, Russell felt from the very beginning that his paradox can be resolved through 
a correct theory of descriptions.22 Later, he remembered that after years of abortive efforts 
to solve the paradox, the first success came with his Theory of Descriptions. “This was, 
apparently, not connected with the contradictions, but in time an unsuspected connection 
emerged” [Russell 1959: 79].
But, what exactly was the connection between the solution of the paradoxes of self-
reference and the Theory of Descriptions? First of all, with the introduction of objects of 
acquaintance as a legitimate part of logic, Russell also (re)introduced complexes we are 
acquainted with into his logic. In this way, Theory of Descriptions limited the competence 
of the propositional functions, and thus partly restored the realistic mereology of com-
plexes and simples, embraced in 1898, but rejected in 1900.
Secondly, with the introduction of the concept of “incomplete symbols”, Russell also 
made two other emendations to his logic, both of which were directed at eliminating the 
splitting of logic into different levels:
(i) He first eliminated classes, and also relations, as entities. After 1905, he maintained 
that classes are only “incomplete symbols” and hence, are not objects. To be more precise, 
Russell introduced the “no class” theory in [Russell 1907: 45]. There are no classes but 
also no propositions and no propositional functions (cf. § 4). “A propositional function 
standing alone may be taken to be a mere schema, a mere shell, an empty receptacle for 
meaning, not something already significant” [Russell 1919: 157].
It is true that after 1907, with the introduction of the Ramified Theory of Types, Rus-
sell adopted a stratified language with ordered variables. But, he never spoke about 
orders of entities (objects) again. Only the constituents of judgements are stratified into 
22 In a letter to Jourdain on 14 March 1906, Russell wrote: “In April 1904 I began working at the Contradiction 
again, and continued at it, with few intermissions, till January 1905. I was throughout much occupied by the 
question of Denoting, which I thought was probably relevant, as it proved to be” (quoted according to [Grattan-
Guinness 1977: 79]). 
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individuals (particulars) and universals. In other words, now he maintained that there are 
types of classes (attributes), but these can be presented by only one type of variable. 
In other words, there is a hierarchy of classes but not of objects.
(ii) Also in 1907, Russell discovered that propositions and propositional functions 
produce paradoxes of their own. (Of course they do: they are unities.) In consequence, 
he came to maintain that there are no propositions. To be more exact, these were elimi-
nated with the help of the Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment. According to it, propo-
sitions only receive meaning (i.e. unity) through the judging mind: “Propositions are 
incomplete symbols that require the context of judging mind in order to achieve a mean-
ing” [Stevens 2005: 79]. It follows that the truth-bearers are judgements, not propositions. 
The ontology of Principia Mathematica is also based on this conception.
As a result, in Principia Mathematica, Russell adopted a full rehabilitation of the 
ontology of the complex and simple. Both classes and propositions were declared incom-
plete symbols. With this step, the many-order logic left ontology; now it was restricted 
to the logical language exclusively (see [Chihara 1972: 262–263]).
Incidentally, despite all the difference between their logics, at the beginning of the 
1920s, towards the end of his days, Frege reached a similar conclusion: the only way 
to avoid paradoxes in logic is to refuse to use the concept of (intensive) class as total-
ity (or class-concept). The adoption of this position was supported by the acceptance of 
explicit geometrism in logic. Frege realised that the assumption of classes cannot guar-
antee a convincing treatment of infinite unities (including infinite numbers); this can 
only be done by the spatial and temporal intuition (see [Dummett 1981: 663]). As it has 
been shown elsewhere [Milkov 1999], Frege’s change of heart was also helped by the 
fact that his logic was crypto-intuitive from the very beginning. In fact, his foremost 
preconception was that logical objects can be grasped and operated only via geometri-
cal intuition. 8. Epilogue
Russell was a revolutionary philosopher who aimed at suggesting a clear programme 
to radically reform the philosophy of his time. In particular, he was convinced that the 
new techniques introduced in mathematics and mathematical logic can finally solve many 
obscure philosophical paradoxes. This was the gist of his “scientific method in philosophy” 
which was to replace the dialectical method of the British Neo-Hegelians.23
The literature on Russell has so far mainly discussed the ways in which he abandoned 
the method of the Neo-Hegelians after he embraced his scientific method of analysis. 
The present paper follows another direction. Since Russell formed his philosophical in-
tuitions in the context of German Learning, he cannot escape being influenced with 
Hegelian topics as well. This is true, in particular, about the problem how units (totalities) 
relate to their constituents, which was the central topic of Hegel’s logic. Exactly this 
subject-matter gave also rise to Russell’s paradox.
The conclusion we reached in this paper is that the elimination of classes, relations, 
propositional functions, and propositions from Russell’s ontology was more efficient 
in solving the paradox of classes than the official device introduced for this purpose — 
his Ramified Theory of Types. In particular, Russell’s eliminative programme banished 
23 It was also to replace the dialectical method of the British Neo-Lotzeans.
135Логико-философские штудии. Вып. 14
N. Milkov. The 1900 turn in Bertrand Russell’s logic, the emergence of his paradox…
the many-levelled ontology he was prone to follow after its 1900 turn, which, in many 
ways, hampered his method of analysis.
Unfortunately, Russell did not clearly realise that his paradox emerged in connec - 
tion with the problem of constructing unities (totalities) from individuals (objects, terms). 
That is why he never considered the solution of his paradox in the wake later followed 
by Leśniewski and Gödel.
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